Abstract-Communication security and reliability are two important issues in any network. A typical communication task in a wireless sensor network is for every sensor node to sense its local environment, and upon request, send data of interest back to a base station (BS). In this paper, a hybrid multipath scheme (H-SPREAD) to improve both the security and reliability of this task in a potentially hostile and unreliable wireless sensor network is proposed. The new scheme is based on a distributed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol, which is able to find multiple node-disjoint paths from every sensor node to the BS simultaneously in one route discovery process. Then, a hybrid multipath data collection scheme is proposed. On the one hand, end-to-end multipath data dispersion, combined with secret sharing, enhances the security of the end-to-end data delivery in the sense that the compromise of a small number of paths will not result in the compromise of a data message in the face of adversarial nodes. On the other hand, in the face of unreliable wireless links and/or sensor nodes, alternate path routing available at each sensor node improves the reliability of each packet transmission significantly. The extensive simulation results show that the hybrid multipath scheme is very efficient in improving both the security and reliability of the data collection service seamlessly.
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I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT ADVANCEMENT in the microprocessor, memory, and wireless networking and communication technologies have paved the way for the deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). A WSN is typically composed of a large number of low-cost sensor nodes, which work collectively to carry out some real-time sensing and monitoring tasks within a designated area. This emerging technology has drawn a growing attention recently, since it provides a promising solution to many challenging tasks, such as military sensing and tracking in a hostile ground, remote sensing in nuclear plants, mines, and other hazardous industrial venues, real-time traffic monitoring, real-time weather monitoring, wild animal monitoring and tracking, etc.
Manuscript received March 9, 2005 Realization of a WSN faces many challenges. Although some of the wireless ad hoc networking techniques are applicable to WSNs, a WSN differs from a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) in many aspects [1] . For example, the number of nodes in a WSN is usually much larger than that in a MANET. Typical sensor nodes are more resource constrained in terms of power, computational capabilities, and memory. Sensor nodes are typically randomly and densely deployed (e.g., by aerial scattering) within the target-sensing area. The postdeployment topology is not predetermined. Although in many cases the nodes are static, the topology might change frequently because of unreliable wireless links and failure-prone sensor nodes. Moreover, a MANET is typically infrastructureless; the end-toend communications are the common communication pattern, and a WSN is typically formed around one (or more) base station (BS, a.k.a. sink). All the sensor nodes are usually designed to sense its local environment, and upon request, send data of interest back to the BS, which is generally several magnitudes more powerful than the sensor nodes and serves as a concentration point of the WSN and at the same time the nexus connecting the WSN to the rest of the world. Reliable and secure data collection is an important task in such a WSN.
Reliability, which is defined as the successful end-to-end data-delivery ratio, has been an issue in WSNs, since the nodes are prone to failure, and the wireless transmission between the nodes are susceptible to all kinds of interferences. Security is another issue since the sensor nodes, when deployed in a hostile ground, are subject to compromise. Generally, it is not economically feasible to make the sensor nodes tamper proof, which means that once a node is compromised, all the secrets stored in that node including cryptographic keys may be compromised too, which jeopardizes the information relayed by that node. Multipath traffic dispersion has been known as an effective strategy to improve the reliability in the face of path failures caused by unreliable links and frequent topological changes [2] . However, an improved reliability can be achieved only at the cost of an excessive redundancy, that is, sending more data than necessary along the multiple paths, such that, the reconstruction of the original information can tolerate up to a certain amount of path failure/packet loss. In [3] , we proposed a secure protocol for reliable data delivery (SPREAD) for the end-to-end message delivery in a MANET. In stead of using the single shortest path to route the data from one node to the other, the SPREAD splits a message into multiple shares using the secret sharing scheme, and then delivers the message shares to the destination via the multiple independent paths. The SPREAD idea was shown to be effective in improving the security, in the sense that, it is more resistant to collusion attacks of up to a certain number of compromised nodes. However, from the security perspective, little or none redundancy should be added to the information transmitted. The amount of information redundancy required makes the security and reliability two seemingly contradicting objectives for the schemes based on the multipath routing.
In this paper, we first propose a distributed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol, based on which, we then propose a hybrid multipath scheme to achieve a more reliable and more secure data collection task in WSNs. While most of the multipath routing protocols are source-initiated and aim to find multiple disjoint or partially disjoint paths between a single source-destination pair [4] - [11] , the distinct feature of our N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol is that, it is receiverinitiated (i.e., BS initiated), and at the end of one route discovery process, the protocol finds every sensor node a set of node-disjoint paths to the BS simultaneously. It is highly efficient with an average overhead of less than one routing message per path. Then, we investigate the hybrid multipath data collection scheme, which combines the concurrent multipath dispersion for the end-to-end data collection and alternate path routing for each individual packet transmission. The simulation results show that our hybrid scheme, Hybrid-SPREAD or in short H-SPREAD, can achieve significantly better reliability and better security seamlessly with little or even none redundancy. The proposed scheme is extremely suitable for WSNs, where the major task is for the BS to collect sensor readings from all the sensor nodes simultaneously.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The SPREAD idea is briefly reviewed in Section II. The distributed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol and its evaluation are presented in Section III. In Section IV, a framework for security and reliability analysis is provided, and the active packet salvaging strategy is proposed. The overall performance of the H-SPREAD is evaluated in Section V. Finally, related work is reviewed in Section VI, and conclusion is drawn in Section VII.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF SPREAD
In [3] , we proposed the SPREAD scheme as a complementary mechanism to enhance data confidentiality in a MANET. The basic idea and operation of the SPREAD is as follows. A secret message m is transformed into multiple shares, S 1 , S 2 , . . ., by the secret sharing scheme, and then delivered to the destination via the multiple independent paths. Due to the salient features of the secret sharing and the distributed fashion of the multipath delivery, the SPREAD has been shown to be more resilient to a collusive attack by up to a certain number of compromised nodes, namely, even if a small number of paths/nodes/shares are compromised, the message as a whole is not compromised.
A number of coding schemes can be used to split the traffic for the multipath routing in order to enhance the reliability. Examples include well-known Reed-Solomon codes, diversity coding [12] , multiple-description coding, etc. In the SPREAD scheme [3] , we used the threshold secret sharing scheme to split the information. A (T, N ) threshold secret sharing scheme could transform a secret into N pieces, called shares or shadows. The nice property of the N shares is that form any less than T shares one cannot learn anything about the secret, while with an effective algorithm, one can reconstruct the secret from any T out of N shares. The generation of shares is very simple-by evaluating a polynomial of degree (T − 1)
at point x = i to obtain the ith share
where a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a T −1 are the secret bits, while p is a large prime number greater than any of the coefficients and can be made public. Note that when all the coefficients are used to carry the secret bits, the fraction of a redundant information is (N − T )/N . For T = N , there is no redundant information resulting from the secret sharing.
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According to the fundamental theorem of algebra, T values of a polynomial of degree (T − 1) can completely determine the polynomial (i.e., all its coefficients), while any fewer values cannot determine the polynomial (at least computationally difficult). Thus, any T shares can reconstruct the original secret bits, but any fewer shares cannot. Efficient [O(T log 2 T )] algorithms have been developed for a polynomial evaluation and interpolation [13] . In addition, the reconstruction is done in the BS, which is not computationally constrained very much. Therefore, in our H-SPREAD scheme, we still choose the secret sharing as the coding scheme.
III. N -TO-1 MULTIPATH DISCOVERY PROTOCOL
A challenging job in any multipath routing scheme is the efficient and effective multipath routing protocols. In [3] , we discussed the multipath finding techniques between a single source-destination pair. In fact, most of the current multipath routing protocols fall into this category (refer to Section VI). In response to the communication pattern in the WSN, in this paper, we propose a novel N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol. Instead of finding the multiple paths between a specific source and a specific destination, the proposed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol takes advantage of flooding in a typical route discovery process and finds multiple node-disjoint paths from every sensor node to the common destination (i.e., the sink node) simultaneously. The proposed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol is essentially the enabling technique for our hybrid data collection scheme. Therefore, we first present the distributed protocol and evaluate its path finding capability in this section. 
A. Motivation and Overview
A typical task of the WSN is the data collection, where the BS broadcasts the request for the data of interest, and every sensor node (or nodes that have the data of interest) sends its readings back to the BS. For this purpose, Berkeley's TinyOS sensor platform utilizes a flooding-based beaconing protocol. The BS periodically broadcasts a route update. Each sensor node when receiving the update for the first time rebroadcasts the update and marks the node from which it receives the update as its parent. The algorithm continues recursively until every node in the network has rebroadcasted the update once and found its parent. What follows is that, every node forwards the packets it received or generated to its parent until the packets reach the BS [14] . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the beaconing protocol essentially constructs a breadth first spanning tree rooted at a BS. It finds every sensor node a single path back to the BS efficiently. However, reliability and security suffer from the single path routing. The failure of a single node or link will disrupt the data flow from the node itself and all its children. Similarly, a compromise of a single node will cause the information leakage from the node and all its children.
The proposed N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol is based on the simple flooding initiated at the BS. Then, by carefully incorporating two other mechanisms into the protocol design, it is able to find for every sensor node the multiple nodedisjoint paths back to the BS at the end of a distributed path discovery process. To facilitate the understanding, we present the multipath discovery procedure in two phases, with each phase implementing one of the mechanisms. In fact, the second phase can be started at each individual node in a distributed fashion without considering the completion of the phase one at other nodes. The mechanism used in the phase one, which is termed as a branch-aware flooding, takes advantage of the simple flooding technique. Without introducing additional routing messages, the mechanism is able to find a certain number of node-disjoint paths, depending on the density of the network topology. The mechanism used in the phase two, which is termed as a multipath extension of flooding, helps to exchange the node-disjoint paths found in the phase one among the nodes on different branches. At the cost of some more message exchanges, it is able to increase the number of paths found at each sensor node.
B. Phase One: Branch-Aware Flooding
The general form of the routing messages in both phases is {mtype, mid, nid, bid, cst, path}, where mtype indicates the type of message. We define mtype = "RP RI" for phase one, which refers to a "primary," because the primary paths (i.e., on the shortest path tree) are found by this type of messages; mid is the sequence number of the current routing update; nid is the identifier of the node sending out the message; bid is the identifier of the branch defined as nid of the node closest to the BS in the branch; path contains a sequence of nodes, which the message has traveled; and cst is the cost of the path.
The propagation of the RPRI messages follows exactly the same way as the TinyOS beaconing protocol. The BS initializes a routing update periodically (or on demand) by broadcasting a message {RP RI, mid, Sink, ∅, 0, (Sink)}. Every node, say z, when hearing a message {RP RI, mid, nid, bid, cst, path} for the first time, marks a node nid as its parent, and it also learns the primary path back to the BS by following the reverse order of p = path + (z). It then forms a new routing message {RP RI, mid, z, (bid == ∅)?z : bid, cst + cost(z, parent(z)), path + (z)} according to the following rules: replacing the nid field with its own ID; if the bid field is ∅, replacing the bid field with its own ID, otherwise keeping the original bid intact; updating the cst field by adding the cost from z to the node from which this message is received; and updating the path field by appending its own ID at the end of the old path. Node z then rebroadcasts the new message in the neighborhood.
In the simple flooding protocol (such as the beaconing protocol), a node simply ignores the duplicate route-update messages from other nodes. However, in our branch-aware flooding, when a node z hears the same message (i.e., identified by the same mid) from a neighbor, it will check the content of the message and mark the neighbor accordingly. If the message has the same bid as the node z itself, z will mark that neighbor as a child or sibling, according to the path contained in the message. If the message has a different bid, which means that the message is from another branch, z will mark that neighbor as a cousin. Node z maintains an alternate path set Q z . Once receiving a message from a cousin node, z will further examine the path contained in the message. If the new path q = path + (z) is disjoint from the primary path p and any other alternate path with a lower cost in Q z , the new path q will be included into the Q z , while at the same time, paths with higher cost than q that share common nodes with q will be removed from Q z . Same as the beaconing protocol, the propagation of the RPRI messages is terminated at the leaf nodes when each node has rebroadcasted the message once and only once.
The branch-aware routing technique is actually based on the following observation. As shown in Fig. 2 , the number of branches that a tree has depends on the number of immediate neighbors that the BS has (e.g., four branches in the example).
The maximum number of the node-disjoint paths from any node to the BS is thus bounded by the number of branches. We notice that while each node has a primary path to the BS by following its tree links up, a link between two nodes that belong to two different branches will provide each node an alternate disjoint path to the BS through the other. For example, as shown in Fig. 2 , while node w has the primary path (w − r − l − g − d − Sink) back to the BS, it learns another alternate path (w − v − q − k − e − a − Sink) from node v, which is not in the same branch as w when overhearing the v's broadcast. The branch-aware flooding is therefore designed to allow the nodes to go across a cousin link, thereby finding the disjoint paths in other branches. This mechanism takes advantage of the broadcast nature of the wireless communication. Without introducing extra routing messages, nodes that have cousin neighbors are able to find a few disjoint paths.
C. Phase Two: Multipath Extension of Flooding
The ability of finding extra paths by the branch-aware flooding is limited to nodes that have cousin neighbors. In what follows, we present a second mechanism/phase proposed for our N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol-a multipath extension to the flooding technique, which is able to find more node-disjoint paths at each sensor node at the cost of some extra message exchanges.
Phase two message exchange uses the same message format but with mtype field set to "RALT", which refers to "alternate," because this type of messages finds the alternate paths. The RALT messages are used to further propagate the alternate paths found at one node to its parent and sibling/cousin neighbors. 2 The propagation of the RALT messages is initiated distributively and independently at each node, where an alternate disjoint path(s) is found during the branch-aware flooding. For each alternate path q, node z forms a RALT message {RALT, mid, z, q.bid, q.cst, q} and broadcasts it in its neighborhood.
Upon receiving a RALT message {RALT, mid, nid, bid, cst, path}, node z will ignore it if it is from its parent. Otherwise, it will check and see if itself is already in the path contained in the message. If not, node z learns about a new path q = path + (z). Again, node z includes the new path q into its alternate path set Q z , if q is disjoint from any other paths in Q z of lower cost. If q is included, node z excludes from the path set Q z paths of higher cost and intersecting with q. Whenever a new path q is added to Q z , node z forms a new RALT message {RALT, mid, z, q.bid, q.cst, q} and broadcasts it in the neighborhood.
The propagation of the RALT messages terminates when no new disjoint path is added to any path set. At this time, each node has found a set of disjoint paths to the BS.
The rationale behind the design of the phase two mechanism is to maximize the number of disjoint paths at each node by further propagating the alternate paths found at the phase one across the multiple branches. Using the same example as shown in Fig. 2 , notice that if w further propagates the disjoint paths that it learned to its neighbors, its parent or siblings/cousins might learn a new disjoint path as well. For example, node r has the primary path 
D. Performance Evaluation
We use simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed N -to-1 multipath routing protocol. We simulate the WSN consisting of 100 nodes randomly deployed in a field of 100 × 100-m square area. The BS is located in the middle of one edge. Nodes have the same transmission range in one experiment. In order to evaluate the impact of an edge density on the performance, we vary the transmission range in different experiments to adjust the edge density in the network. We tried four different transmission ranges, 15, 20, 25, and 30 m.
3 Table I summarizes some topological parameters of the networks simulated when using a different transmission ranges, including the average node degree d (i.e., the number of neighbors a node has) and the average network diameter D (i.e., the maximum hop count from any sensor node to the BS based on the shortest path routing). The simulation results are averaged over 60 random network deployments. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the figure. Fig. 3 shows the total number of routing messages and the total number of disjoint paths found in the simulated networks. We observe that the branch-aware flooding mechanism finds the disjoint paths without introducing any extra message exchanges. When the edge density is high, say when the average node degree is 21, this simple modification could find an average of eight node-disjoint paths per node. Our multipath extension of the flooding mechanism, although requiring more message exchange, is able to find more paths. The results show that in general, the routing algorithm is very efficient in terms of path finding-the per path cost is less than one message.
The next three figures reveal some more characteristics of the paths found. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of nodes in terms of their distances from the BS. Correspondingly, Fig. 5 depicts the average number of node-disjoint paths found per node with regard to the distance between the sensor nodes and the BS. It is observed that the closer the node to the BS, the more paths from that node to the BS. This is reasonable, because it is harder to find the node-disjoint paths when the nodes are far away from the BS, as each alternate path has to find more unused nodes to reach the destination. This property is actually desirable for the tasks we are considering. Since the typical task of the network is to collect data from all the sensor nodes, packets are traveling from everywhere toward the BS. Nodes that are closer to the BS would be used more for forwarding traffic, thus, it is more desirable for those nodes to be more reliable. More alternate paths give a node more choices in the face of the node or link failures, thus inferring better reliability. Fig. 6 shows the average hop count per path correspondingly. The dotted line is plotted as the reference, indicating the shortest distance to the BS. It is observed that the average path length is typically one or two hops longer than the shortest path, regardless of the length of the shortest path.
The typical data collection in a WSN involves the following communication patterns: 1) broadcast from the BS to the sensor nodes (e.g., requests of data of interest); 2) from the sensor nodes to the BS (e.g., sending back the sensor readings); and 3) node to node communication (e.g., if aggregation of the sensor readings are applied). In this section, we described our multipath discovery protocol that, similar to any on-demand routing protocol, starts with a route update initialized at the BS. This route update is a network-wide broadcast, thus can be used to fulfill the aforementioned type-(1) communication. Then at the end of the discovery, each node will be able to find a set of multiple node-disjoint paths to the BS with which, our hybrid data collection scheme can be implemented for the type- (2) communication. We do not consider a data aggregation explicitly. However, if the data-aggregation centers are to be applied, a hierarchical routing structure can be constructed: From each sensor node to the aggregation center forms the lower layer, and from each aggregation center to the BS forms the higher layer. Our proposed algorithm could be made applicable to each layer separately.
IV. SECURITY AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF H-SPREAD
In this section, we provide an analytical framework to analyze the security and reliability achievable from the proposed H-SPREAD scheme. More specifically, by "reliability," we mean the probability that a message generated at one sensor node can actually be routed to the BS, and by security, we mean the probability that the adversaries/compromised nodes can intercept the message. The purpose of the security and reliability study is twofold: 1) provide analytical measures to evaluate the security and reliability of the data delivery when applying our scheme and 2) provide insights to design a shareallocation scheme that will tolerate failures and compromised nodes in the best possible way (probabilistically).
A. Security Analysis
We first consider security. Assume that M disjoint paths have been selected to deliver the message. Vector q = [q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q M ] denotes the security characteristics of the paths, where q i denoting the probability that the ith path might be compromised. 4 Let vector n = [n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n M ] denote the share allocation, meaning that the n i packets are assigned to the ith path for delivery, n i is an positive integer, and M i=1 n i = N . We assume that if one path is compromised, all the shares traveling along that path are compromised. Since paths are mutually node disjoint, we further assume that the compromising of each path is independent. Let ψ(i) denote the indicator function on path i: with a probability q i , ψ(i) = 1, indicating that the ith path is compromised and with probability (1 − q i ), ψ(i) = 0, indicating that the ith path is not compromised. Then, the number of shares compromised given, the allocation n will be given by M i=1 ψ(i)n i . Notice that the adversaries have to compromise a minimum of T shares in order to compromise the message. The probability that the message might be compromised (P C ) is then given by
where J is the total number of shares compromised among the N packets delivered across the M paths.
In [3] , we have shown that depending on the number of paths selected to deliver the message (M ), 5 the maximum security can be achieved when allocating the N shares onto the M paths, in such a way that the adversaries must compromise all the M paths to compromise the message. The maximum security that is measured as the minimum probability, in which the message might be compromised (P C ) is
We have also shown in [3] that the SPREAD scheme can be designed in such a way that a certain degree of redundancy can be added without sacrificing the security. The maximum redundancy that can be added without scarifying the security is bounded by
where the redundancy factor r is defined as r = 1 − T /N, and M is the number of paths selected to deliver the message shares. 6 Then proper (T, N ) values (i.e., integers) could be selected, and the optimal share allocations could be designed to achieve the maximum security and at the same time be able to tolerate a certain degree of packet losses. For example, for M = 3, T = 8, and N = 10, the optimal share allocation would be [4 3 3] , by which the adversaries must compromise all the three paths to get enough shares, while the scheme can tolerate the loss of two packets. Notice that the optimal share allocations proposed are in terms of security, although achieving a maximum security, they actually do not tolerate the loss of a complete path. In fact, the improved reliability obtained from this type of traffic dispersion essentially comes from the redundancy added to the data traffic, which should be much enough to tolerate one or more complete path failure. This makes the security and reliability as the two contradicting objectives when using the concurrent multipath routing approach, meaning that the reliability relies on the excessive redundancy, while the security requires no or little redundancy.
The direct calculation of P C is hard, since it needs to enumerate all possible (2 M ) combinations of ψ i and sum up the probabilities of those satisfying the condition. Fortunately, efficient algorithms have been developed for this type of problem in the reliability evaluation of k-out-of-n system models. Particularly our problem is similar to the reliability evaluation of the weighted-k-out-of-n systems, which were proposed in [15] , and where an efficient algorithm for computing the reliability of the system was presented. The calculation of P C can be derived as follows. Without a loss of generality, we assume that R(j, i) denotes the probability that a 5 The number of paths found between a source to a destination can be larger than M . Depends on the required security level, it is not necessary to use all the paths. Only the first M most secure paths that meet the desired security level are selected. 6 A tighter bound is r ≤ 1/M − 1/N . minimum of j packets are compromised from the first i paths. Then P C can be calculated as
where R(T, M ) can be calculated using the following recursive equation
which requires the following boundary conditions:
The computational complexity of (3) for
) when n i = 1 for all i. However, when n i > 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M , the number of terms to be computed may be much less than that. In addition, the intermediate values are meaningful that represent R(j, i) for 1 ≤ j ≤ T and 1 ≤ i ≤ M . These values are helpful in understanding the assessment of the probability accumulatively.
B. Reliability Analysis
Next, we evaluate the reliability of the proposed data collection scheme, namely, how "reliable" a message generated at one sensor node can actually be routed to the BS. In fact, in the WSN, both sensor nodes and wireless links are error prone. Node failure might be caused by a physical node failure (e.g., physical damage or depletion of the battery) or heavy congestion at the node, which causes a packet drop due to a buffer overflow. Link failure might be caused by a media access contention, multiuser interference, or any interference, which causes the radio signal not being correctly decoded at the intended receiver. If we assume that each node has an equal probability p n0 to reliably relay a packet, and each link has an equal probability p l0 to reliably deliver a packet, the probability, in which a path consisting of H hops can successfully deliver a packet, will be p = p H n0 p H l0 (we assume the destination is reliable).
In [2] , the authors proposed an analytical model for the evaluation of the reliability of multipath routing in MANETs. They considered the packet loss due to topological changes, therefore, they modeled each path as a pure erasure channel, namely, if a path fails, all the segments transmitted on that path will be lost, otherwise, all the segments on that path is assumed received. This model is similar to the model we described for security analysis and can be viewed as a model of the node-failure problem in our case. The authors proposed to use a Gaussian approximation to calculate the reliability. Their analytical results showed that the multipath routing is more resistant to the node-failure problem, and the packet delivery ratio can be improved. However, the improved reliability highly relies on the excessive redundancy added (actually redundant paths), which will impair the security purpose as we just discussed.
In what follows, we evaluate the reliability from the linkfailure perspective. In other words, we assume a network with perfectly reliable nodes but unreliable links. The failure of a packet's transmission is caused by the link failure and is independent of other transmissions. We make this assumption in order to gain some insights on the impact of the link-failure problem on the multipath routing. Moreover, in the combinatorics of network reliability, an undirected problem with node failures can be transformed into a directed problem without node failures [16] . In some cases, this assumption can often be avoided. In the above example, the path reliability with the node failures is just the probability that all nodes are operational times the path reliability without node failures.
Similar to the problem formulation for security analysis, we assume that M disjoint paths have been selected, each of which is reliably delivering packets with probability p i (i =  1, 2, . . . , M) . Let again use vector n = [n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n M ] denote the share allocation, which allocates n i packets onto the ith path. Let χ i (j) denote the indicator function on path i: χ i (j) = 0, which indicates that the jth packet is delivered successfully, and χ i (j) = 1, which indicates that the jth packet is lost. Thus, p i = P r{χ i (j) = 0}, and
is the number of packets lost over the ith path. Based on this assumption and the fact that as long as the total number of the lost packets among the N packets is less than or equal to N − T , the original information can be correctly recovered by the BS, we obtain that the probability of a successful delivery (P R ) is given by
where L is the total number of the lost packets among the N packets delivered by the M paths. In fact, an intuitive solution to this problem is that, given p, we can maximize this probability by assigning as many as possible shares to the most reliable paths and assign as few as possible shares to the least reliable paths. This result actually implies that, given the intermittent packet failure model described here, the best reliability is achieved by allocating all the packets to the most reliable path. The multipath traffic dispersion is not helpful in improving the reliability in this situation.
C. Alternate Path Packet Salvaging
We notice from the above analysis that the multipath routing is effective in improving the reliability in the face of persistent errors, such as the node failure or persistent link errors (i.e., pure-erasure-channel model), while it does not help in the case that the loss of packets is due to intermittent link failures. This observation indicates that the security and reliability are two contradictive design objectives with regard to the redundancy added-reliability requires more redundancy while security requires less or no redundancy. We also notice that the above analysis is based on the endto-end concurrent multipath routing, meaning, the information is split at the source, and the segments are spread onto the multiple paths between the source and the destination pair. However, the single path routing is assumed for the delivery of each packet/share. This is true for most of the multipath routing approaches proposed in the literature, where the proposed multipath routing protocols aim to find the multiple disjoint paths between a single source and the destination pair on-demand. The end-to-end multipath routing approach essentially relies on the redundant paths to improve the reliability, while the unreliability of each path remains unimproved. Therefore, the results are the low efficiency of the reliability improvement and the excessive redundancy, which deteriorate the foundations of our security enhancement.
A distinct feature of our multipath discovery protocol is that, it finds multiple node-disjoint paths at each sensor node. If the WSN uses a reliable MAC protocol, such as IEEE 802.11, which acknowledges the successful transmission of each frame, each node knows whether the transmission is successful or not before it removes the frame from its transmission buffer. Therefore, taking advantage of the multiple paths available at each hop, we adopt an active per-hop packet salvaging strategy so that, the reliability of each packet delivery (or each path) can be greatly improved. It works as follows. Each packet carries with it the source routing option. At an intermediate node z, if the transmission to the next hop is not successful, z actively salvages the packet by sending it to another randomly selected available route to the destination rather than dropping the packet. Only when all the next hops from the node z to the BS fail should the packet be dropped. Fig. 7 shows an example that a packet originated at the node t is salvaged twice at the node p and f , respectively, and finally reaches the destination. One potential problem here is when a node salvages a packet with a new path, but that new path consists of a node that the packet has already traveled. In this case, a routing loop would result. This problem can be easily solved by the source-routing option. Notice that our multipath discovery protocol guarantees the loop freedom for all the paths selected. Each packet carries the source-routing option when it is sent out. At an intermediate node, when the salvaging needs to be done, the node makes sure that no loop would form by comparing the partial route that the packet already traveled and the candidate path it would use to salvage the packet. Only when there is no common node would the candidate path be selected. Then the intermediate node modifies the source-routing option carried in the packet by replacing the rest of the source route with the newly selected salvaging path. When a node reaches the BS, what it carries is the actual path it traveled through.
The per-hop alternate path packet salvaging is an effective and efficient way to improve the reliability. Particularly, it improves the reliability on a per packet/path basis without imposing a redundant information. This property complements our necessity of the H-SPREAD in improving the reliability with little or no redundant information. Alternate path routing is not a new idea, and it has been adopted in many single-pathrouting protocols, such as dynamic source routing (DSR) and ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV), whenever possible to improve the unreliable packet delivery in MANETs [7] - [9] . However, the availability of the alternate paths is the key and also the challenge to fully enjoy the performance enhancement. Obviously, our N-to-1 multipath discovery protocol has paved the way to exploit this technique and has made it particularly suitable to apply this technique to improve the reliability of each path in our H-SPREAD data collection scheme.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the overall security and reliability performance of the proposed H-SPREAD scheme, namely, the combination of the concurrent multipath routing on the end-toend data collection task and the alternate path routing on each packet delivery along the designated path.
We run the N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol we proposed in Section III. Then, we consider the impact of the node failure, link failure, as well as compromised node problem. We assume that the node failure is persistent. Once a node fails, it cannot be used to forward packets. Link failure is intermittent and is independent of each packet transmission. When a link error occurs to a packet, no retransmission is performed for the same packet. Node compromise is persistent too. If a node is compromised, all the shares/packets relayed by that node are considered compromised.
Due to a space limitation, we only report results in networks where the transmission range is 20 m (refer to Section III-D for network parameters). Each node, which is at least two hops away from the Sink node, initiates 100 messages. Each message is divided into N = 10 shares and spread onto M paths (M = 1, . . . , 7). For M = 1, the shall allocation vector is n = [10] , namely, all the ten shares go through the primary path. The simulation results are averaged over 300 randomly generated networks. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the figures. The X-axis is the threshold T (with N set to ten in all simulations), which can be interpreted as the level of redundancy. Here, the reliability is represented by the probability that a message is successfully delivered, which is calculated as the total number of messages received at the BS over the total number of messages initiated from all the sensor nodes. A message is received when at least T shares of the message reach the BS. Similarly, the security is represented by the probability that a message is compromised, which is calculated as the total number of messages compromised over the total number of messages initiated by all the sensor nodes. A message is compromised when at least T shares are compromised by the compromised nodes, collectively. Therefore, T = 10, which means no redundancy, and either the BS or adversaries must receive/intercept all the ten shares to recover a message. It is observed that without salvaging, the packet-loss rate is sensitive to the redundancy level and is unacceptably high even with an excessive redundancy (small T values). However, our alternate path packet salvaging effectively maintains a very high (close to 100%) delivery ratio at all redundancy levels, even with a zero redundancy. On the other hand, we observe that the security is very sensitive to the redundancy-the less redundancy, the more secure the scheme is. The (red) dotted line is drawn as the reference. It represents the security level achieved when all the nodes and links are reliable, therefore, no salvaging is performed. 7 As expected, the salvaging weakens the security a little bit because of a possible overlapping of the paths. However, the impact is not significant compared with the significantly improved reliability. This is the most desirable property that enables our proposed scheme to improve both security and reliability at the same time.
Figs. 9 and 10 plot the security and reliability performance as a function of the number of paths used, respectively, with various network error and threat conditions. It is clear that our scheme is effective in reducing the probability that a message might be compromised. We observe that, although the active packet salvaging breaks the independence of the paths, the probability that the message might be compromised decreases with the increase of the number of paths used to spread the information. Notice that the situations we studied are very challenging, with 10%, 20%, and 30% of the nodes compromised. In fact, in less-challenging situations, the improvement would be more significant (i.e., curves dropping more steeply). The results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme-it is more resistant to the collusive attacks of the compromised nodes. Correspondingly, the reliability performance shows that the proposed scheme is able to maintain a pretty good messagedelivery ratio in the face of both link and node failures. Again, the situations we studied are very stressful, with 10%, 20%, and 30% of the nodes failed. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed scheme with the active alternate path salvaging is more robust to the node-failure problem too.
VI. RELATED WORK
Efficient data delivery in WSNs is a challenging task. Direct diffusion [17] , [18] and sensor protocols for information via negotiation (SPIN) [19] are two exemplary data-dissemination paradigms. As a data-centric approach, a direct diffusion employs a low-rate flooding to establish gradients and use gradual reinforcement of better paths to accommodate certain levels of network and sink dynamics. The SPIN adopts meta-data negotiation to eliminate the redundant data transmission and is suitable for the scenarios where an individual sensor disseminates its observations to all sensors in a network. Some other approaches for the data dissemination in WSNs include the flooding-based gossiping [20] , probabilistic-based flooding [21] , [22] , geometry-based flooding [23] , [24] , clusterbased low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) [25] , hierarchical-based two-tier data dissemination (TTDD) [26] , etc.
Multipath routing has been a promising technique in MANETs in order to aggregate the limited bandwidth, to smooth the burstiness of traffic, to alleviate the network congestion, and to improve the fault tolerance, and most importantly, to improve the reliability. Several multipath routing protocols have been proposed to find the multiple disjoint or partially disjoint paths between a single source and destination pair [5] - [11] , [18] , [23] . These multiple paths can be used in different ways. One way is to use them alternatively, namely, use the primary path first, when the primary one fails, switch to the secondary one, and so on. The other type of usage is to use the multiple paths simultaneously.
Our approach distinguishes from most previous work in that: 1) Our N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol is receiver-initiated (in contrast to the common source-initiated route discovery), and the protocol is efficient that, it finds the multipath from every sensor node to the BS, which fits the special communication pattern of the WSN very well [27] - [29] . 2) We adopt a hybrid multipath approach for the data delivery. We use the concurrent multipath scheme to spread traffic onto the multiple disjoint paths for the end-to-end data delivery. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the multiple paths available at each node, the per-hop alternate path packet salvaging uses the multiple paths alternately, which helps to improve the reliability of each packet delivery/path significantly.
3) The overall scheme improves both security and reliability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Data collection is an important task in a WSN. Reliable and secure techniques are desired to perform the task efficiently. In this paper, we consider a WSN where the typical task is to disseminate the data requests from a BS to all the sensor nodes and to collect sensor readings from every sensor node back to the BS. We first propose an efficient N -to-1 multipath discovery protocol, which initiates a route update periodically or on demand at the BS, and at the end of each discovery process, finds every sensor node a set of node-disjoint paths back to the BS. Then based on the availability of the multiple paths at each node, we propose a hybrid multipath scheme for secure and reliable data collection task. The simulation results show that the proposed multipath discovery protocol is very efficient, with less than one message per path found. The proposed hybrid multipath data collection scheme is more resilient to node/link failures and a collusive attack of the compromised nodes. It is effective in improving both reliability and security at the same time.
